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DEFENDING A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION
USING THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY AND
ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE DEFENSES TO
TORT LIABILITY
Michael M. Harrison
Defense attorneys in Arkansas are, not infrequently, called
upon to defend religious institutions from tort suits brought
against them for a variety of reasons. Such claims may arise out
of a motor vehicle accident involving a church bus, a slip and fall
accident on church premises, a claim of sexual molestation on the
part of a church employee, or another type of claim. In defending
claims against religious institutions, it is imperative that the
defense of charitable immunity and, where applicable, the
Ecclesiastical doctrine, be raised in the first responsive pleading
to the Complaint, be that an Answer and/or a Motion to
Dismiss. As such, defense counsel should plead in the Answer,
among other affirmative defenses, Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule
12(b)(6) failure to state a claim sufficient to form the basis for
relief. He or she should also affirmatively plead the client’s notfor-profit entity status, citing its Internal Revenue Service
501(c)(3) designation. Furthermore, defense counsel should raise
the defense that the claim violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the separation of church and state
doctrine.1 Essentially, this argument is that a secular civil court

Michael McCarty Harrison is a partner at Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP in the
firm’s Litigation Practice Group. She focuses her practice on insurance defense and
coverage, products liability, medical malpractice, personal injury defense, transportation
litigation, fire/arson investigation and defense and appellate advocacy. Prior to joining the
firm, Harrison spent 20 years developing a strong litigation practice in Little Rock and has
been recognized for her work by Mid-South Super Lawyers. She is a member of the
Defense Research Institute and the Arkansas Association of Defense Counsel, of which she
served as past president.
1. See Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61, 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993); Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark.
371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988); Arkansas Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church
v. Hudson, 344 Ark. 332, 40 S.W.3d 301 (2001).

50

ARKANSAS LAW NOTES

2021

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine and/or interpret
church doctrine.
Under Arkansas law, charitable not-for-profit organizations
are immune from tort liability under the well-established doctrine
of charitable immunity.2 The purpose of the “charitableimmunity doctrine is that organizations such as agencies and
trusts created and maintained exclusively for charity may not
have their assets diminished by execution in favor of one injured
by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or
trust.”3 In Low v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that based upon the express language of the directaction statute, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210, a
charitable organization is immune from both tort liability and suit
against it.4 Arkansas courts have consistently interpreted the
statutory language, “immunity from liability in tort,” to constitute
immunity from suit.5
Typically, a Motion for Summary Judgment is needed in
order to prove to the court that the client is a not-for-profit or
religious institution and is therefore entitled to immunity from
both tort liability and suit. In order to obtain a dismissal, exhibits
will be necessary to prove the same. In determining whether an
entity is charitable and, therefore, entitled to charitable immunity,
Arkansas courts consider several factors, including:
(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable
or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s
charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the
organization’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the
organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or
surplus [the entity earns] must be used for charitable or
eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization
depends on contributions and donations for its existence; (7)
whether the organization provides its service[s] free of
charge to those unable to pay; and (8) whether the directors

2. See Jackson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 533, 294 S.W.3d 1 (2009).
3. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d 457, 460.
4. 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005).
5. See Ramsey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 234 Ark. 1031, 356 S.W.2d 236 (1962); Williams
v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969); Harvill v. Cmty. Methodist
Hosp. Ass’n, 302 Ark. 39, 786 S.W.2d 577 (1990); Jarboe v. Shelter Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 395,
877 S.W.2d 930 (1994); George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710
(1999); Smith v. Rogers Grp., Inc., 348 Ark. 241, 72 S.W.3d 450 (2002).
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and officers of the organization receive compensation [for
their services to the organization].6

However, this list is “illustrative, not exhaustive, and no single
factor is dispositive of charitable status.”7
In examining the first and second factors of the eight-factor
test, one must look at the charitable entity’s Charter and/or
Articles of Incorporation. Typically, such documents contain
language limiting the organization to act only for charitable
purposes or include a not-for-profit limitation on its actions, or
both.8 Some also include language to the effect that the
organization is organized for “purposes that qualify as tax exempt
under current sections of the Internal Revenue Code.”9 Others
provide that the organization is limited “exclusively for
charitable, civic, social, cultural, and educational purposes.”10
All such language is sufficient to satisfy factors one and
two. However, some language allows the organization to
“engage in all purposes . . . permitted by applicable law.”11 This
is not a fatal flaw, as the Arkansas Supreme Court has explained,
“[t]he first and second [factors] are perhaps the easiest of the
6. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d at 460-61 (quoting Masterson v. Stambuck,
321 Ark. 391, 401, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995)).
7. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 6, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (citing Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902
S.W.2d at 810).
8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Suggested Language for Corporations and
Associations (per publication 557), IRS (Feb. 2, 2021), [https://perma.cc/93FW-CCRP]; see,
e.g., Neal v. Davis Nursing Ass’n, 2015 Ark. App. 478, at 4, 470 S.W.3d 281, 283 (holding
that it was “undisputed that Davis satisfies factors 1, 2, and 8” because “Davis’s charter limits
its operation to charitable purposes and contains a not-for-profit limitation”); see also
Progressive Eldercare Services-Saline, Inc. v. Krauss, 2014 Ark. App. 265, at 3, 2014 WL
1758914, at *2 (holding that “[s]ome factors presented to the court would favor entitlement
to charitable immunity” because “Progressive’s charter limits it to charitable or
eleemosynary purposes, the charter contains a ‘not-for-profit’ limitation, and its directors
and officers do not receive compensation”).
9. See, e.g., Gain, Inc. v. Martin, 2016 Ark. App. 157, at 4, 485 S.W.3d 729, 732
(holding that “[t]he first and second factors [were] established by Gain’s articles of
incorporation, which provide that Gain is a public-benefit corporation under the Arkansas
Nonprofit Act of 1993” and declaring that Gain uses “any funds ‘for charitable and
educational purposes as a nonprofit corporation’”).
10. See St. Bernard’s Cmty. Hosp. Corp. v. Chaney, 2021 Ark. App. 236, at 9, 2021
WL 1900046, at *5 (stating that “CrossRidge’s articles of incorporation provide that
CrossRidge is a corporation organized ‘exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, and
educational purposes’”).
11. See Rohrscheib v. Barton-Lexa Water Ass’n, 246 Ark. 145, 148, 437 S.W.2d 230,
232 (1969) (opining that the language of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64—1904 “provides that these
non-profit corporations may be organized under the act for any lawful purpose or purposes”).
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factors to demonstrate as they are merely a matter of possessing
corporate documentation reflecting nonprofit and charitable
character.”12 In other words, as long as the documents establish
the organization was created for not-for-profit and/or charitable
pursuits, it will pass muster, notwithstanding language allowing
it to engage in other endeavors.
Such documentation should be obtainable from the client
itself. However, if for some reason the client is unable to provide
the documents, they are easily obtainable from the Arkansas
Secretary of State’s office, as the organization would have had to
file the documents when it was established.13
If the
organization’s purposes have changed over the years, there may
be more than one Charter and/or Articles of Incorporation, and all
must be reviewed to ascertain if, in fact, the appropriate language
is still in place and the organization’s primary purpose at the time
of the accident or incident giving rise to the cause of action was
for charitable endeavors.
The third through eighth factors are typically proven by
affidavit of the organization’s chief executive or chief financial
officer and will need to include testimony that the organization
seeks simply to “break even and not to earn a profit.”14 The
affiant should also attest that if there is a profit, “all proceeds
received in excess of its operating costs” are invested back into
the organization for further, future charitable purposes. 15
The same analysis applies to the fifth factor about “whether
any profit or surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary
purposes.”16 This “factor examines what an entity that does
produce a surplus actually does with it.”17 Thus, a charitable
organization can earn a profit, “so long as the money thus
received is devoted altogether to the charitable object which the
institution is intended to further.”18

12. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 212, 987 S.W.2d 710, 713 (1999).
13. See ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE, Doing Business in Arkansas 8 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/FV6H-K88H].
14. See generally George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 713.
15. See, e.g., id. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 713-14.
16. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting
Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 401, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995)).
17. George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
18. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.

2021

DEFENDING A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

53

Most modern not-for-profit organizations do not rely
entirely on contributions and donations, which Arkansas law has
recognized in examining factor six. As explained by George v.
Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, while depending only on donations would
make “an even clearer case of charitable immunity,” the proof of
an organization’s “organizational structure as presented do[es]
not negate its overriding charitable purpose.”19 In further
explanation, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held:
In considering the sixth factor, we note that Sparks does not
depend solely on contributions and donations for its
existence. Most of its operating funds are provided through
Medicare, Medicaid, and individual patients or their private
insurers. While the nonprofit hospital in George only
received donations totaling approximately 6% of its financial
obligations, this court stated that ”a modern hospital,
with rare exception, would find it extremely difficult to
operate wholly or predominately on charitable
donations.” As was the case in George, the fact that
Sparks receives most of its funding through sources other
than contributions or donations does not “negate its
overriding charitable purpose.”20

The client may well primarily rely upon federal grants, state
grants, Medicare payments, and/or private insurance payments
for services rendered. However, such contributions or donations
are likely tax-deductible and, therefore, do not jeopardize the
organization’s charitable status.21 Thus, it is vital to secure an
affidavit attesting to the overriding charitable purpose of the
organization and how contributions or donations to it are
implemented for those purposes. The affiant should be an
individual with knowledge of the organization’s activities. For
instance, testimony in the affidavit that any proceeds received in
excess of the organization’s “operating costs are returned to the
organization to acquire, renovate, and operate its organization and
further its charitable purposes” covers all the bases.22

19. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
20. Jackson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 533, 541, 294 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (2009)
(emphasis added) (citing George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 710).
21. See Jackson, 375 Ark. at 541, 294 S.W.3d at 6.
22. See Neal v. Davis Nursing Ass’n, 2015 Ark. App. 478, at 5, 470 S.W.3d 281, 284
(stating that “Davis’s bylaws require that its board members and officers serve without pay”
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Finally, regarding factor eight, which is “whether the
directors and officers receive compensation,” the Arkansas
Supreme Court has ruled “it is not necessary for a charitable
organization to have entirely volunteer staff and
management.”23 Instead, Arkansas law permits a not-for-profit
organization’s executives to earn a salary so as to attract wellqualified individuals to these offices.24 Arkansas courts have
explained for factor eight:
[I]t is not necessary for charitable organizations to have
entirely volunteer staff and management. [The hospital’s]
size and complexity make knowledgeable, well-qualified
personnel essential. Such persons do not readily volunteer
their services or serve at rates of compensation markedly
lower than market rates.25

In George, although the charitable entity’s chief executive
officer and chief financial officer both received a yearly salary of
$225,000 and $170,000, respectively, and had a potential bonus
compensation available to them, the court held that these facts did
“not put the hospital in the position of being maintained for the
private gain, profit, or advantage of its organizers.”26 A Motion
for Summary Judgment, supported by the organization’s Charter
and/or Articles of Incorporation, and an affidavit from a chief
executive of the organization addressing each of the abovereferenced eight factors, should position the client well for a
speedy dismissal based upon the charitable immunity doctrine.
With regard to religious institutions, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that civil courts do not have
jurisdiction to interpret or implement church doctrine.27 The
Arkansas Supreme Court agrees.28 In Gipson v. Brown, the court
and “Davis contends that any profits earned would be held and reinvested in its continued
operation”).
23. See George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714; Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 300,
308, 289 S.W.3d 903, 908 (2008) (finding compensation permissible when the top three
executives earned more than $230,000 per year and the chief executive officer earned
$350,000 per year).
25. George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
27. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 694
(1976).
28. See Ark. Presbytery of Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 344 Ark. 332,
40 S.W.3d 301 (2001).
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noted the Ecclesiastical doctrine’s intent and purpose and found,
absent fraud or collusion, the United States Supreme Court has
held since 1872:
that when civil courts get involved in matters of church
discipline or ecclesiastical government, it requires looking
into the customs, usages, written laws, and the fundamental
organization of religious denominations, which deprives
these bodies of the right to interpret their own church laws
and opens the door to all sorts of evils.29

The court in Gipson went on to state “deference [must be given]
to decisions of ecclesiastical bodies on matters of internal church
governance.”30
In the Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop decision, Justice
Brandeis, writing for the majority, stated, “[i]n the absence of
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
court as conclusive.”31 Similarly, in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme
Court held that when religious institutions establish rules for
internal governance, “the Constitution requires that civil courts
accept their decisions as binding upon them.”32 Further, the
Supreme Court has held religious freedom encompasses the
power of religious bodies to “decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church governnment as well as those
of faith and doctrine.”33
In many instances, for a circuit court to find a duty owed by
and/or liability on the part of a religious institution, it would,
necessarily, first need to interpret, and thereby pass judgment
upon, the structure and organization of the entity’s internal faith
and doctrine. This is especially true in cases involving alleged
misconduct of a church employee and even more so if there are
allegations of negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention of an
employee. It is clear from the above holdings that to do so would
29. Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 376, 749 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1988) (citing Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872)).
30. Gipson, 295 Ark. at 376, 749 S.W.2d at 299 (citing Gonzalez v. Roman Cath.
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)).
31. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.
32. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 619 (1979) (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25)
(emphasis added).
33. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
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be contrary to constitutional law. However, an early-filed Motion
to Dismiss asserting the Ecclesiastical doctrine should lead to a
dismissal of the suit in its entirety, or at least those causes of
action requiring interpretation of church structure and
management.
In conclusion, the charitable immunity and Ecclesiastical
doctrine defenses are useful tools in a defense counsel’s arsenal
when defending a religious institution client. When plead
promptly and supported by the proper documentation and
affidavit evidence, either or both should result in a dismissal of
the entity without protracted litigation or costs being incurred.

